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Why has the scholarship on ASEAN Plus Three not anticipated the emergence of the 
trilateral cooperative framework among Japan, Korea and China? The trilateral 
‘dialogue’ that in 2008 took shape in a format separate from ASEAN has become a 
key surprise in Asian regionalism. Given the direct link to ASEAN Plus Three (APT), I 
review possible explanations based on trends in APT as they have been depicted in 
the literature. The implications of this exercise are as follows. While too much weight 
has been attached to promoting scholarly ‘labels’ – Sino-Japanese competition, 
power of ASEAN to socialize, and economic focus in APT – far too little attention on 
the other hand has been afforded to note Korea’s regional preferences, pre-existing 
contradictions, and varied roles of APT. To respond better to similar challenges in the 
future, the scholarship on Asian regionalism needs to attach more value to 
elaborating and testing of alternative scenarios. 
 
 
Introduction 
Our present crisis … has been coming for a long time and we should have 
seen it coming. Naomi Oreskes, University of California, San Diego2 
“ASEAN Plus Three” established in 1999 has been favored by many as the 
most important regional framework in East Asia. This attracted a great deal of 
analytical effort, especially at the onset of the 21st century, resulting in a 
substantial and widely quoted body of scholarship (Soesastro 2001; Stubbs 
2002; Beeson 2003; Hund 2003; Terada 2003; Yoshimatsu 2005; Dent 2008). 
As a narrowly understood East Asia, the debate on ASEAN Plus Three (APT) 
has concentrated on the validity of this “region” – its chances to prevail 
against the competing, broader concept of the Pacific. In the course of this 
scholarship, however, strong notions have been produced and defended. 
Even as these notions give us a fuller idea of what APT is (a playground for 
competition), and what it is not (a coherent regional idea), they have also 
made the field very tight – to the point that new regionalist projects, so 
welcome on the conflict-prone Asian soil, are hard to accommodate by the 
scholarship.  
The “Trilateral Cooperation” (TC) among Japan, South Korea, and China, 
initiated within APT in 1999 and established independently from it in 2008, is 
such a surprise in Asian regionalism. To borrow from the above quotation of 
                                                 
2
 Quoted in Robin McKie, “Attacks paid for by big business ‘driving science into dark era,’” 
Observer, February 19, 2012, p. 20. 
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Naomi Oreskes, we had now known that the TC “was coming.” Once it 
emerged, it casts doubt on some of the key arguments about ASEAN Plus 
Three: the Sino-Japanese “rivalry”, the driving force of ASEAN, reluctance of 
Japan toward Asia-only groupings, and so on. A pursuit of explanatory closure 
– any one or more from the above – has led to zero anticipation of the TC, 
hard to reconcile with the prevailing notions, as this is a grouping with only 
three Asian states, including China but excluding ASEAN. It makes us think 
about the direction that the scholarship on Asian regionalism, APT in 
particular, has taken. The price for calibrating research frameworks to zoom in 
on the most salient features of APT has been to lose track of the less 
prominent features that in effect proved consequential. 3  
The argument I advance is that the interaction among the units – nation-states 
– gave rise to the cooperative constellation of the Northeast Asian three 
(NEA-3). 4  To move us toward the explanation, I first review competing 
approaches to APT, taking from them along the way any clues about the TC 
emergence. This extensive study brings me then to outlining the remaining 
developments that have been mere sideshows in the literature: Korea’s 
regional vision (i); contradictory bilateral dynamics (ii); and the role of APT 
beyond economics (iii). I conclude with an agenda to make analytical 
frameworks on Asian regionalism more flexible, in this way conductive to a 
long-term study. The whole point here is to make our findings more durable 
and thus more useful to future generations of IR scholars. Then we might 
know where Asian regionalism is headed, and we might have foundations of a 
theory to explain those movements. 
 
Explaining the Trilateral Case 
There has been much scholarly concern about how to promote cooperation in an era 
of eroding US economic hegemony. Yet these issues have received little 
                                                 
3
 Note the difficulty in making arguments running contrary to the common 
assumption. Unlike most studies on regional dynamics, Etel Solingen finds that the 
Japan-China competition argument “overplays” this presumed rivalry (2008).  
4
 TC denotes a new organization, and with NEA-3 I stress the set of three countries, Japan, 
China, and Korea. 
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consideration in non-western and non-northern hemispheric contexts. Higgott 
(1993:290) 
ASEAN, a Southeast Asian organization, has been the host of ASEAN Plus 
Three that embraces Japan, Korea, and China. In 1999, the Northeast Asian 
“three” held an informal breakfast meeting only among themselves.5 This was 
the beginning of the “trilateral cooperation,” which took an independent form in 
2008 when the summit was held in Japan.6 The evolving separation reached a 
new level with the establishment of the trilateral secretariat in Seoul, a 
development that has permeated into some recent literature (Emmers and 
Ravenhill 2011: 17; Pempel 2011; Rozman 2011: 307; Terada 2011: 13).  
The trend of downsizing the role of ASEAN started with “three plus ASEAN,” 
showcasing the symbolic order of power in favor of Northeast Asia.7  The role 
of the three in providing “primary initiative” led to this 3+10 term (Evans 
2005:197, ft. 1). After the 2008 inaugural summit, the talk became of “three 
minus ASEAN” (Economist 2008; Weatherbee 2009), to showcase ASEAN’s 
actual exclusion. “As for the APT, ASEAN members initiated the regional 
grouping and each year the summit meeting takes place on ASEAN soil” 
(Eaton and Stubbs 2006:141). 
In this paper I go back to APT-based arguments, keeping separation of the 
trilateral summit in hindsight. 
Before ASEAN+3 
Intergovernmentalism that stresses the role played by state leaders is one of 
the pathways to explanation (Yoshimatsu 2008). Having realized growing 
economic interdependence, three leaders revised their perceptions of regional 
cooperation:  
“economic and industrial linkages between China, Japan and South Korea have 
gradually deepened since the late 1990s … These evolutions since the late 1990s 
                                                 
5
 Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Korean President Kim Dae-jung and Japanese Prime Minister 
Keizo Obuchi hold the first trilateral meeting of three states’ leaders in ‘modern times’ at the 
sidelines of APT meeting in Manila (Yoshimatsu 2008:65). 
6
 Martin Fackler, “China, Japan and South Korea focus on economy at summit,” New York 
Times, 13 December, 2008. 
7
 Yoshimatsu (2004:13), quoting Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s Senior Minister. 
  
5 
might change the perception of regional cooperation among the heads of state and 
government in Northeast Asia.” Yoshimatsu (2008:62)  
This explanation is summarized as “awareness of regional interdependence,” 
a term at the crossroads of Liberalism and Constructivism (Goh and Acharya 
2007:5).8   
This explanation is weighed down with at least two problems. First, it treats 
China as a source of growing interdependence, a passive player, not 
necessarily the case: “…perhaps slightly overlooking the importance of how 
the APT framework also provides an opportunity to engage Japan and South 
Korea…” (Breslin 2010:728). Second, this explanation cannot provide a 
satisfactory answer concerning the set of countries. Yoshimatsu (2008) 
implies that particularly Japan and Korea were attracted to trade with China. 
But there is evidence to the contrary. ASEAN has already concluded an FTA 
with China, while Japan and Korea have a long way before possibly doing so.9 
Convergence of foreign economic policies on China has been East Asia-wide 
rather than NEA-specific: “In fact, the uniforming impacts on some or all of the 
regional states have been so significant that foreign policy orientations among 
those countries, including Japan, have converged on China” (Terada 
2010:75). We find in the intergovernmental explanation no clue why Japan, 
Korea and China in particular, so we seek deeper into the meaning of 
convergence. 
The convergence can be understood in terms of domestic policy preferences: 
“Convergence theories understand the dynamics of regional cooperation and 
especially regional economic integration in terms of converging domestic 
policy preferences among regional states” (Hurrell 1995:356). Despite the 
uniformity, there is a major difference in how scholars assess China-ASEAN 
and China-rest of Northeast Asia economic ties: “While China’s economic 
appetite has revived the high-technology economies of Japan, South Korea, 
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 See Sterling-Folker (2000) for an article that promises to deal with the similarity between 
liberalism and constructivism. 
9
 But note the concluded negotiations on a new, trilateral investment treaty, “the first legal 
framework in the economic field among the three countries.” See 
http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/business/T120322005713.htm (accessed March 25, 2012). The 
agreement was signed during the 5
th
 Trilateral Summit in May 2012: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2012/5/0513_01.html.  
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and Taiwan, it has simultaneously sucked investment out of the largely 
technology-less economies of Southeast Asia” (Jones and Smith 2007:165). If 
Northeast Asia indeed differed from Southeast Asia over China, it would be a 
powerful explanation to why NEA-3 emerged. But a frequent reference is to 
divisions within Northeast Asia – the so-called “fractious Northeastern core” 
(Calder and Ye 2010:112) – rather than to a potential split to China’s north 
and south. 
Catalysts 
Northeast Asia through the crises: 1997 and 2008. After the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997, the global crisis of 2008 proved to be another turning point that 
encouraged scholars to focus on catalytic properties of major crises for 
regional cooperation: “In particular, the case of the trilateral relationship 
between China, Japan, and South Korea (ROK) is an indication of how such 
crises [2008 global crisis] can trigger pragmatic efforts for cooperation and 
deepened regional ties” (Sato 2009:107). 
One view holds that the global crisis has spurred competition between China 
and Japan in financial affairs, and the inaugural trilateral summit in 2008 
became a playing field for pursuing this competition (Terada 2010:88). 
Another view stresses the “regional-global” connection, where regional moves 
are a defensive response to challenges generated internationally (like in Sato 
2009:107). Possibly, the crises appeared ‘auspiciously’ at a moment when 
support for Asians-only movement would otherwise flag.10 
The main caveat to the crisis explanation is that it is merely catalytic. The 
decision about the 2008 summit meeting was made already in 2007. The 
three countries announced separation of the trilateral summit on the occasion 
of the APT-based trilateral summit in November 2007, Singapore: “The 
leaders of the three countries agreed to take turns hosting China-Japan-Korea 
Summit Meetings in each country, independently from other multilateral 
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 Already in 1995 Japan’s interest in EAEC weakened (Yong Deng 1997:50-51); APT and 
thus trilateral meetings faced trouble in 2008 in the light of Thailand’s (host country) internal 
problems (Weatherbee 2009).  
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occasions such as the ASEAN.”11 The New York Times wrote: “The summit 
meeting was originally planned months ago, before the turmoil in financial 
markets began in September, with the vague goals of building good will and 
establishing political dialogue.”12  
Even before the 1997 regional crisis, important processes were already in 
place: “The seed of Northeast Asian regionalism was laid in 1993 and 1994, 
prior to the economic crisis in 1997, when the ASEAN countries (at that time 
only six) invited South Korea, Japan and China to join them in broader 
discussions” (Choi, YJ 2008:48-49). “There was no specific agenda for those 
meetings. Soon enough, this process attracted the involvement of heads of 
state” (Soesastro 2001:1). 
“For historical reasons, China, Japan and South Korea have not had an easy 
time cooperating with each other. But ASEAN was hit hard by the financial 
crisis of 1997 and moved closer to these three countries on the pretext of 
receiving aid”.13 The 1997 Asian financial crisis urged the region to cooperate, 
with the call coming from ASEAN. The crisis highlighted a relative decline in 
ASEAN’s role (Calder and Ye 2010:186; emphasis added). Then, the global 
economic crisis in 2008 reestablished the ground for such cooperation, this 
time not just with ASEAN14.  
East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). East Asian Economic Caucus 
(EAEC), in particular, highlights the truth that ‘East Asian’ thinking was 
developed before the 1997 crisis hit; the crisis hit only against the background 
of existing regional processes and ideas. Only few accounts refer to ASEAN-
Northeast Asia interaction prior to APT.15  
Already in 1991, ASEAN made the decision to invite Korea as a “full dialogue 
partner,” and China as an observer (Ba 2009:197-198). These meetings were 
convened mainly in response to Mahathir’s proposal for EAEC, made in 1993 
                                                 
11
 http://www.tcs-asia.org/ .  
12
 Martin Fackler, “China, Japan and South Korea focus on economy at summit,” New York 
Times, 13 December, 2008. 
13
 Yoichi Iwamoto, “ASEAN seeks ways to retain regional initiative,” Nikkei Weekly, 
November 16, 2009 (accessed through Factiva, January 10, 2011). 
14
 My thanks to Professor Shaun Breslin for this observation. 
15
 See Chin Kin Wah (2009:24) for evolution from EAEC to APT. 
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(Goh and Acharya 2007:2-3). Mahathir won Japanese, South Korean, and 
finally also Chinese support (Calder and Ye 2010:185). ASEAN foreign 
ministers endorsed this idea, and in 1994 three foreign ministers from 
Northeast Asia joined their Southeast Asian counterparts for the first meeting 
in this setting, identical with APT membership (Yong Deng 1997:50; Ba 
2009:198; Terada 2003:261-262). 
While prior meetings are evidence of another explanation, they are not 
explanation in themselves. 16  “But Mahathir’s proposal was also critically 
different because it was explicitly premised on the argument that ASEAN was 
no longer enough” (Ba 2009:145).17 “ASEAN is not big enough to carry clout. 
But if China, Korea, and Japan are with us, perhaps people would pay 
attention”.18 In this sense, the mid-1990s foreign ministers meetings spurred 
Asians-only thinking, before the Asian crisis reinforced the trend. In this way, 
EAEC is a bridge to the APT explanation. 
 
APT as a Field for Trilateral Interaction 
In essence, nobody really focused on the trilateral cooperation during the 
evolution of APT.19 We, students of regional frameworks in East Asia – have 
good reasons to be taken by surprise more than anybody else by the 
emergence of TC. It is because the literature on ASEAN+3 – the framework 
from which the separate format of trilateral cooperation conspicuously 
emerged – has been pointing us in a different direction. It is at least puzzling 
that when one reads literature on APT from late 1990s/ 2000s, one could 
hardly deduce that Japan with Korea and China would strengthen 
                                                 
16
 I thank Professor Breslin for suggesting such a formulation. 
17
 It was Singapore to propose holding “more regular” meetings between Southeast and 
Northeast Asia (Ba 2009:198). 
18
 Abdul Jabar, a spokesman for the Malaysian Embassy in Washington, D.C., quoted in Ba 
(2009:145). Originally quoted in George White and Teressa Watanabe, “Asian Economic 
Unity?,” Los Angeles Times, March 4, 1991. There is an interesting parallel between this 
quote and the statement by the first secretary of the Korea-Japan-China cooperation, who 
said: “These are three already influential nations we are talking about. Can you imagine the 
extent of influence they will enjoy as one big group?” (Shin Bong-kil, quoted in Korea 
Herald, 13 June 2011). 
19
 Thank you for this observation to Professor Shaun Breslin. 
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cooperation! It is a useful exercise to go back to this literature with anticipation 
of some hints to Northeast Asian cooperation. 
Support to the thesis that Japan, China and Korea show no common agenda 
in APT comes from the finding that Japan and China show little cooperation in 
their policies regarding ASEAN.20 It is reflected in the practicalities of APT 
meetings. When APT is held, ASEAN, Japan, Korea, and China each have 
their chairman. Only for finance, the three Northeast Asian members choose a 
common representative.21 APT has acted as a platform for competition rather 
than cooperation for the three Northeast Asian states. 
Balancing initiative. The prevalent position on APT stresses Japan-China 
rivalry. Two features are common to this literature: 1) no room for Korean role, 
at times de facto leadership; and 2) a strong focus on FTAs as a predominant 
mode of regionalism. Two things combined, this approach centers on Japan-
China ‘rivalry’ in concluding FTAs in the region; especially their attempts at 
outdoing each other in taking initiative. Balancing initiative has become a 
salient feature of regional trends: “Within APT, China is aggressively pushing 
a strong China–ASEAN axis, whereas Japan is seeking to balance China’s 
efforts and step up its political and economic cooperative profile in the region” 
(Hund 2003:383; emphasis added). 
“But the Realist-favored notion of balance of power can also be seen as 
having its basis in normative and social foundations, as evident in notions 
such as ‘soft balancing’ or ‘institutional balancing’” (Acharya 2008:73). Soeya 
observes that “this competition between China and Japan is not of geopolitical 
nature but rather conceptual” (Soeya 2009:301). Power politics are played in 
institutions; it is “realist institutionalism” or institutional balancing.22 
By “balance of initiative” I mean a situation in East Asia where Japan and 
China compete by multiplying initiatives geared towards weaker partners. 
ASEAN most often acts as the weaker side. On rare occasions Korean 
                                                 
20
 Interview, 2010, Japan. In this draft, I will refer to material from interviews as “interview, 
Japan, 2010” or “interview, Korea, 2011,” without referring to the specific interviewees 
(anonymity). 
21
 Interview, 2010, Japan. 
22
 Interview, 2010, Japan. 
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position in the midst of this rivalry is acknowledged; unlike in the past, in 
present regional trends Korea is not the subject of Japan-China rivalry. 
Rather, as the third regional power, it also produces efforts to show initiative.  
 How does the balance-of-initiative proposition fits with the emergence 
of Northeast Asian initiative? Precisely, it is another attempt at generating 
initiative in the already “crowded market” for regional projects. 23  With 
Northeast Asian initiative in this way attributed to Japan, it is tempting to see it 
as an attempt to forestall a Chinese move in the style of a pre-emptive 
theory”24, or to set agendas where Japan retains competitive advantage. One 
would be hard-pressed to use balance of initiative to explain emergence of a 
cooperative framework featuring major regional rivals – importantly, featuring 
China. Yet, proponents of this interpretation seamlessly move from “tripartite 
intra-Northeast Asia divides” (Hund 2003:386) to origins of the Northeast 
Asian initiative. In the same article that ascribes to Japan the role of “promoter 
of intra-Northeast Asian dialogue,” we read that “[c]learly, Japan is 
discouraging exclusively East Asian approaches” (Hund 2003:398, 394).  
Sino-Japanese rivalry might bear fruit for region-building in the sense that it is 
reflected more in balancing initiative than balancing power. ‘Cooperation 
through competition’ results in multiplication of regional strategies on the part 
of both rivals. This view bridges the reality of Sino-Japanese rivalry with the 
parallel reality of building new cooperative forums (like the Northeast Asian 
one). In other words, rivals for regional influence end up in the same 
cooperative frameworks.  
Overlapping initiatives bring puzzling consequences as NEA-3 springs up 
from “ASEAN Plus One” rivalries. Tendencies presented in the literature 
suggest robust development of ASEAN Plus One, in which each Northeast 
Asian state deals with ASEAN unilaterally, preferably outdoing its 
‘competitors’ in promptness of ASEAN-aimed initiatives. In many ways, 
ASEAN Plus One(s) processes have eclipsed APT (Breslin 2010:724; also Ba 
2006:163-164): “For fear of being overwhelmed by the ‘combined might’ of the 
Plus Three, they have undoubtedly found it advantageous for ASEAN to 
negotiate separately with China, Japan and South Korea” (Tay 2002, quoted 
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 This expression I owe to Professor Richard Higgott. 
24
 I am thankful for such an apt label to Professor Takashi Terada. 
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in Webber 2010:323). A tripartite competition, where even Korea is pictured 
as one of “Japan’s rivals” (Terada 2010:87), does not make the task of 
explaining more cooperation easier. For example: “More countries are taking 
the initiative. China, Japan and South Korea, East Asia’s rival powers, will 
meet this year for a first 3-minus-ASEAN summit” (The Economist, 3 July 
2008). 
But what is the China-Japan “rivalry for regional hegemony” (as in Bae, GC 
2003:89)? It is the simplest question that we need to answer. But the evidence 
of a struggle for “regional hegemony” between China and Japan is not 
compelling. First, it is not clearly understood what such a regional hegemony 
would be about. Second, at the regional level, one does not see signs of such 
a quest on either of the sides. Quoting China-ASEAN and a “reactionary” 
Japan-ASEAN FTAs is not evidence of any “quest,” but is rather based on an 
underlying flaw that ASEAN has been all that important. Pempel (2010a:217) 
writes: “ASEAN was able to take the lead in the APT largely by default.” 
Field of communication. A contrasting line of analysis argues that East 
Asian cooperation stimulates a Northeast Asian one: “APT has contributed 
significantly to cooperation in East Asia and Northeast Asia” (Ye 2008:139; my 
emphasis). This literature takes a position that it is good for China, Japan and 
Korea to meet, as “[t]he East Asian cooperation process also helps to facilitate 
Northeast Asian cooperation” (Zhang, Y. 2005:74). Rather than rivalry, it tends 
to highlight that “APT remains an important mechanism for bringing regional 
elites together” (Breslin 2010:724).  Here, APT is interpreted as a venue,  a 
forum offering an opportunity for exchanges to those who otherwise would 
meet far less frequently, or not at all in a given configuration: “For the first 
time, China, Japan, and South Korea are involved in a regional organization 
that allows for regular trilateral meetings” (Ye 2008:139). It also enabled them 
to develop intra-Northeast Asian channels of communication, notably in the 
form of personal networks among national leaders (Calder and Ye 2004:211-
216). We can call this mode of cooperation a “regional dialogue” (Foot 
1995:229). 
Regional cooperation may involve the creation of formal institutions, but it can often 
be based on a much looser structure, involving patters of regular meetings with some 
rules attached, together with mechanisms for preparation and follow-up. (Hurrell 
1995:336) 
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APT has served as a moderately successful field of communication, but there 
are problems with this explanation. First, claims supporting it were largely 
made before the separation of Japan-Korea-China framework from the APT 
“umbrella”; thus, they did not have to face the research question of 
independent TC. Second, East and Northeast Asian trends have not always 
been compatible. 
 
ASEAN/ Northeast Asia Divide 
So far we have seen what APT has meant for interaction among the three. 
Both lines of analysis are correct; trilateral interaction has meant more 
competition and more communication. It is only lamentable that interaction 
between these two views is hardly considered; scholars generally choose one 
line of analysis – competition or communication/ cooperation.  
Now I shall treat Northeast Asia as one group within APT and analyze its 
position towards ASEAN. 
Socialization of power by ASEAN. The research agenda of this literature 
revolves around “power of ASEAN” (see Eaton and Stubbs 2006) and the 
question: “Is ASEAN able to socialize the major powers in the region?” (Qin 
and Wei 2008:116). The source of the socialization hypothesis lies in the fact 
that Northeast Asian representatives were meeting on the ASEAN soil for 
more than ten years. 
Its exponents note that the three countries launched “Trilateral Cooperation 
Vision 2020”25, presumably following the example of “ASEAN Vision 2020” 
(Ong 2010). While the wording and the custom are deceptively similar, is it 
socialization - or rather copying of ready templates? It can be that NEA-3 at 
times behaves as if it had ‘learnt’ from ASEAN. When considered from a 
different perspective than constructivist, such evidence proves strategy rather 
than socialization. Jones and Smith (2007:182, 184) conclude that “norms are 
what strong states make of them,” as both Japan and China manipulate 
ASEAN’s norms to their own strategic advantage. Projecting power by either 
China or Japan would harm the projector, making it more strategic for them to 
restrain; such behavior does not come from “acculturation” to ASEAN’s norms 
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 FMPRC (2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t705962.htm. 
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(Jones and Smith 2006:184). This simple argument against constructivism 
proves that other hypotheses must be tested before settling on a socialization 
account of the NEA-3 development. The evidence that constructivism 
interprets in one way can be also interpreted in another: “like dots that we can 
connect” to create one image or another (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/02: 
157). 
This debate opens a broader question of whether smaller powers can 
socialize larger ones (Ba 2006:162). Even these accounts that are 
sympathetic to the socialization hypothesis, like Ba (2006) who discusses the 
ASEAN-China case of social learning, conclude that power differentials put 
limits to mutual socialization. While ASEAN was fairly successful in drawing 
China into cooperative arrangements, China was less proficient in convincing 
the weaker side of its benign intentions – especially what regards the long 
term (Ba 2006:170-171). By extension, this argument helps us understand 
why the three East Asian powers have become more efficient in establishing 
common ground; while Korea is still highly asymmetrical in power to China or 
Japan, they are the three most powerful states (in economic terms) in East 
Asia. 
The fact that ultimately they decided to ‘escape’, even as they still hold 
occasional meetings on the fringes of East Asian groupings, is a significant 
input to the debate on whether ASEAN can “socialize” Northeast Asia – 
especially that APT was meant to revitalize ASEAN and reinforce its role in 
the broader region (Jones and Smith 2007:163-164). The actual development 
is headed in the opposite direction, with NEA-3 on the way to eclipse APT in 
global and regional significance (Weatherbee 2009).26 
Putative building of regional identity has shifted research agenda to ASEAN-
centered cooperative processes, which gradually began to involve the core 
Asian powers. ASEAN approach can be credited for bringing attention to 
indigenous processes spreading through the region. Yet, in explaining the 
trilateral case of cooperation, this approach generates more questions than it 
                                                 
26
 Tang (2008:143, ft. 7) draws attention to the problem where citing one another’s work 
serves as ‘evidence’ not supported by collection of original data. A methodological argument 
against socialisation accounts involving ASEAN is that they favour “thick description” over 
hypothesis testing (Jones and Smith 2007:183). 
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can ever answer. “Why have the three states separated themselves from 
APT?” is the most important of them. 
Dominance of “The Three” over ASEAN. Essentially weaker, ASEAN has 
good reasons to fear dominance by the three. Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee 
Kuan Yew pointed out that the grouping can become “Three Plus ASEAN” 
(quoted in Yoshimatsu 2004:13). Contrary to Eaton and Stubbs (2006:141), 
not all scholars agree that ASEAN controls the APT agenda: “While the 
process has been and is essentially driven by ASEAN, the agenda setting was 
not controlled by ASEAN’; Korean and Chinese initiatives in 1998 (East Asia 
Vision Group) and 2000, respectively, prove it (Soesastro 2001:1). Despite the 
name and annual venues, the APT process has been essentially in control of 
the more powerful players. More simply, “[m]any Southeast Asian political 
authorities like to say that ASEAN economic integration is the key to region-
wide integration, but this does not make sense” (Frost 2008: 207).  
Contrary to what is generally believed, Jones and Smith (2007: 184) argue 
that the so-called “ASEAN norms” according to which APT is organized, 
facilitate – paradoxically – “the transformation of weaker states by stronger 
ones.” By far the most ardent critique of ASEAN - and ASEAN scholarship in 
particular - that I have encountered, positions defended in their article are not 
contradictory to the reality of ASEAN/ Northeast Asia divergence that 
emerged later. This suggests that ASEAN is not entirely happy with the 
development in Northeast Asia, a notion reinforced by the following: “ASEAN 
countries had a mixed reaction to this new trilateral cooperation – on the one 
hand, they welcomed progress on expanding the CMI and better relations 
among their Northeast Asian neighbors; yet they quietly expressed anxious 
concern about being left out and potentially marginalized in discussions on 
regionalism among the three powers” (Searight 2010:3). 
ASEAN/ Northeast Asia clash of interest. The presumed objective of APT 
according to Thailand is “narrowing the development gap within ASEAN and 
between ASEAN and East Asia” (Nabers 2003:127) - where ‘East Asia’ 
means the three Northeast Asian members of APT. ASEAN presumably 
wanted to “exploit” APT for obtaining economic and technical assistance from 
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the three (Yoshimatsu 2004:13). This might not be the primary reason for 
which Japan, China or Korea got involved in APT. It leads us to the clash of 
interest hypothesis.  
The original idea behind the EAS was to transform the APT into a more coherent and 
developed regional framework in which any APT member could host a summit, thus 
embodying a more holistic regional concept by conferring China, Japan and South 
Korea with a greater sense of ownership over the East Asia regional community 
building process. (Dent 2008:19) 
 
Expansion of the regional process into wider East Asia via the East Asia 
Summit (EAS) does not change the fact that ASEAN acts as the “gatekeeper,” 
deciding whom to invite. China, Japan and Korea accepted criteria set by 
ASEAN (Qin and Wei 2008:134). 
What we need to keep in mind is that APT process has not been dismantled, 
and new Northeast Asia-only cooperation functions in parallel to APT (Zhang, 
Y. 2005:74). However, holding the dependent summit, “minisummits” (Pempel 
2010a), is decided on a case-by-case basis; if the two happen to coincide 
closely in time, then the dependent summit is likely to be cancelled. 27 
Additionally, ASEAN+1+1+1 formula has not been dismantled either. 
Evidently in the face of “loose regionalism of the APT” (Weatherbee 2009), the 
three wanted to pursue closer cooperation. Japan, Korea and China in the first 
place joined ASEAN in the APT process because it was to benefit them: “For 
ASEAN+3 will be good for ASEAN as well as for its Northeast Asian partners 
– that is why they joined forces” (Alatas 2001). 
ASEAN Plus Three has made advances in financial cooperation. The Chiang 
Mai Initiative (CMI) of swap agreements was ‘multilateralised’ in 2010, it has 
become a binding arrangements for all its members. In 2011, ASEAN Plus 
Three Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO) was set up in Singapore. The 
director comes from China. The biggest beneficiaries are the poorer members 
of ASEAN, whose borrowing rights are their contribution multiplied by 5 (for 
richer ASEAN states it is 2.5; for South Korea 1). For China and Japan, their 
rights are slashed by half – they can draw only ½ of what they each 
contributed.28 It is hard not to admit that China and Japan are benefactors of 
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 See “A rather flimsy firewall”, Economist, April 7, 2012. 
  
16 
the scheme. Yet, how much self interest is there? When the rest of Asia sinks 
economically, the two suffer too. 
Inefficiency of ASEAN. Another hypothesis within the spectrum of ASEAN/ 
Northeast Asia divide points to the inefficiency of APT in delivering results – or 
making progress. “Because East Asians value consultation, consensus by 
unanimity, and comfort level, many of the ASEAN and APT mechanisms are 
not highly effective” (Qin and Wei 2008: 121). In December 2008, internal 
problems in Thailand were responsible for postponement of the APT summit 
(Weatherbee 2009; Chin Kin Wah 2009:33). It is when the inaugural 
(independent) trilateral summit took place. Pempel (2010b:18) adds up to the 
argument that the three were “frustrated with the slowness of ASEAN and the 
APT.” As noted in Yoshimatsu (2004:13), NEA states prefer formal 
agreements. ASEAN is also seen as mistaken in interpreting its role as 
indispensable for Northeast Asian cooperation: “There had been an ASEAN 
assumption that the political differences among its East Asian partners were 
so deep that they could not be overcome in a cooperative arrangement 
without the neutral playing field of ASEAN” (Weatherbee 2009). 
 
The ‘diplomatic glue’ provided by ASEAN (Alatas 2001) is not as powerful as it 
was believed to be (compare): 
[T]he ASEAN+3 should, at least during the initial phase, continue to be “ASEAN 
driven”. This should not be seen as an ambition to assume leadership in the forum 
but as an inevitable consequence of the fact that the bilateral relationship between 
China and Japan (…) leaves us with no better option. (Alatas 2001; emphases 
added) 
 
The view that only ASEAN can play this role, with Japan-China animosity 
leaving no room for a dose of ASEAN-free cooperation, has proven short-
sighted. This would in turn suggest that the role of ASEAN has been taken 
over by Korea: “[T]he regional core triangle will be defined by serious rivalry, 
but that does not mean the third actor cannot try to soften it and find 
advantage in cooperation” (Rozman 2007:202). At the very least Korea has 
acted as a “meetinghouse of cooperation” (Armstrong, Rozman, Kim, and 
Kotkin 2006:145). 
  The “inefficiency of ASEAN” approach prescribes a new institution each 
time a new challenge surprises the existing ones, but it does not tell us why 
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existing institutions have not adapted. A new powerful alternative is 
competition among institutions. Pempel (2010a) refers to it as “institutional 
darwinism"; Goh and Acharya (2007: 7) note it as  “institution-racing.” 
Security thesis. Following Hanamaka (2008), we could try to see whether 
varying preferences for membership depending on issues of cooperation are 
applicable to the case of APT/ NEA-3. If NEA-3 operates within different issue 
areas than APT, it could explain why a new framework was necessary. This 
is, however, contentious.  
APT’s scope of activities is interpreted in many ways. Pempel (2010a:229) 
notes that NEA-3 is prepared to deal with any issue of interest or concern, 
while APT is financial in scope. Thus, he names NEA-3 as one of the few East 
Asian arrangements that combine economics and security on its agenda. 
Developments in October 2010 seem to confirm this: “President Lee and 
Prime Ministers Naoto Kan of Japan and Wen Jiabao of China discussed 
pending issues such as North Korean nuclear ambitions and currency 
conversion rates”.29 However, according to Ye (2008:139), APT does have a 
broad issue agenda, “covering economic, social, diplomatic, and security 
areas.” Also Katsumata (2009:12) notes that “[t]he APT (…) is more than a 
framework for economic cooperation. Since its 1999 meeting, it has to a 
certain extent also served as an arena for security dialogue.” 30  Yet, 
unpreparedness of APT to tackle the security agenda could be important for 
the emergence of NEA-3, especially relevant for Korea. Breslin (2010:724) 
contends that APT provides a collaborative forum for a “range of issues such 
as transnational crime, social welfare and development” – but it does not look 
like a hard security agenda.  
A right path to trace divergence between ASEAN and Northeast Asia might be 
then to follow the security path: “For some time to come, it would not be 
realistic for the forum [APT] to venture into cooperation on political and 
security issues in view of the substantive divergences of policy on these 
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 Jun-kyung Oh, “Lee wraps up Vietnam trip for EAS, ASEAN,” Korea.net, 
http://www.korea.net/detail.do?guid=51019 (accessed 10 December 2010). 
30
 Officially, “security issues like the nuclear safety” began to be discussed in 2002: 
http://www.tcs-
asia.org/data/view.php?cat1=1&cat2=&tabs=&sT=&sF=&page=1&start_page=0&Idx=14. 
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issues among the East and Southeast Asian countries” (Alatas 2001). Also 
Chu (2007:170) ponders the question of NEA-3 as that of a security institution.  
Areas of most advanced cooperation in NEA-3 have been: investment, trade, 
environment31 – surely not security.  
 Emerging evidence seems to support the “security thesis.” Yet, its 
underlying premise–Northeast Asia’s common security concerns as opposed 
to Southeast Asia– misses to answer one important point. Is there something 
“new” in the circumstance that the North Korean problem concerns Northeast 
Asia more than Southeast Asia? The change in favor of the trilateral 
cooperation occurred in 2008; has there been any change in the security 
environment at that point? The security thesis seems to be more about a 
general situation in which Northeast Asia has common security concerns, 
unshared with ASEAN. Then, if the security thesis is to hold, it needs to show 
at least that a change over time occurred - either in the security environment, 
or in policymakers thinking on it. Otherwise, the claim sounds more like an 
afterthought: “Northeast Asian states have common security concerns, 
unshared with Southeast Asia, and that is why a trilateral summit emerged.” 
When put into a causal statement, its incompleteness is revealed. It does not 
explain why this security issue has not led to the trilateral cooperation earlier. 
 
Korea as an Actor Underrepresented in Research 
Korea’s active posture in APT, coupled with its interest in focusing 
cooperation on the Northeast Asian core, both make of Korea an active 
promoter of NEA-3. Korea has maintained an active participation in both APT 
and EAS, although neither of them responded directly to Korean concerns 
(Frost 2008:122). Presumably, already President Kim Dae-jung wanted to 
institutionalize the trilateral summit, but the conditions were not ripe for it (Lee 
and Moon 2008:44). Therefore, he concentrated his diplomatic effort on APT 
instead, in 1998 proposing an East Asia Vision Group (Soesastro 2001:1). 
Although the ‘leadership of East Asian regionalism is ascribed to ASEAN, the 
agenda-setting at some point at least was dominated by Korea. 
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It was Korea to propose launching of the TCCS (Trilateral Cooperation Cyber 
Secretariat), and a (physical) secretariat opened in 2011 was promised – 
unsurprisingly – to Korea.32 In fact, the secretariat is located in Korea because 
President Lee proposed it; Korea drafted the treaty, and it will “organize and 
choose” location.33 Contrariwise, “[t]he coordinating body for APT affairs has 
remained a unit within the ASEAN Secretariat, roughly at a foreign ministry 
desk level, till today” (Qin and Wei 2008:121). Officially, APT falls into the 
category of ASEAN’s “external relations.”34 APT has made little progress to 
become a “codified institution” (Tang 2005:69). Arranging a secretariat for 
APT would be a problem, since the location could easily become “a fresh 
point of contention” (Bae 2005:89). Malaysia was willing to host the 
secretariat; Singapore and Indonesia preferred to keep it within the ASEAN 
secretariat, in Jakarta (Bae 2005:99). Korea was “informally” considering to 
host the secretariat, too (Bae 2005:99).  
Korea’s significant role in realizing the trilateral agenda goes against little 
attention paid to Korea’s preferences in the literature, favoring Japan and 
China. As predicted, in a way, in Calder and Ye (2004), we see now Korea 
acting as an “institution broker” (217). This is more than a passive bridging of 
Japan’s and China’s differences; it is instead a responsive posture toward a 
new institutional opportunity. Even if the secretariat in Seoul provides 
bureaucratic support rather than generating a real momentum for the trilateral 
cooperation, it is still a development significant enough to be called a 
breakthrough, and a challenge to the scholarship that sidelines Korea. 
 
Accommodating Contradictory Dynamics 
Several features of East Asian regional interactions, as literature chooses to 
present them, stand in tension with the emergence of NEA-3. Bilateral ties 
among the three do not fit comfortably with the emergence of TC. 
Explanations based on bilateral improvements, consciously or not, put Japan 
at the center of the analysis. It is Japan that has strained relations with both 
neighbors. For this reason, the bilateral argument is much more about Japan-
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China and Japan-Korea pairs, rather than the Korea-China side of the 
triangle. This line of reasoning points to Japan-Korea and Japan-China 
bilateral improvements to explain the necessary conditions for the emergence 
of the separate trilateral framework. Even those who want to focus on bilateral 
ties, however, have utilized ‘hand-shaking’ photos from trilateral summits to 
illustrate their logic (Okonogi 2010 on Japan-Korea ties, Fujiwara 2009 on 
Japan-China ties). Reasoning implying that Sino-Japanese (or any) bilateral 
improvement, at any point in time, was the cause of trilateral cooperation is 
not complete. Such argumentation remains silent on the argument that a 
bilateral improvement could be at best permissive. 
 
Trilateral Logic 
Trilateral idea might attract many people; it is in this sense a “political 
constellation.”35 The following quotation proves that the presence of a third 
country covers the bilateral conflicts with a cooperative varnish: 
 
Since the Senkaku Islands ship collision incident, media sensationalism has raged, 
and Japan-China relations have been greatly shaken. In the middle of this upheaval, 
which involved the cancellation of various Japan-China related events, I went to 
Beijing on September 26 to participate in the Japan-China-Korea Symposium hosted 
by the Chinese East Asia Forum. (Amako 2010) 
From security to economics (finance and trade), this region has been labeled 
as a bastion of bilateralism. To a major extent, “countries of the region are all 
linked together, but the processes are bilateral” (Breslin 2010:724).  
Our case, however, proves that trilateral relations can take a more promising 
course than a collection of regional ties. So far we have observed that the 
bilateral and the trilateral interaction seem to be governed by divergent 
dynamics. It is indeed a puzzle, but only insofar as we treat state interactions 
as belonging to one unitary sphere. Therefore, after Korea’s preferences and 
Northeast Asian security, what we should pay more attention to is the issue of 
separation; at its most modest, it is the separation of economics from security. 
The literature focusing on bilateral relationships ponders scenarios that have 
not materialized. It follows that a trilateral cooperation does not require a 
‘spine’ of a strong bilateral agreement. What we can learn from this exercise is 
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that regional trends, as depicted in literature on East Asian regionalism, are 
ambiguous in terms of explaining our case. 
 
On the Quest for Real Answers 
In a world of over-information, contradiction and extreme uncertainty, there’s 
something incredibly compelling about having a single-word answer to a question 
that, at best, has a definitively uncertain answer.36 
In our quest for true answers, we have started from the observation that in 
Asian regionalism, analytical frameworks are not constructed flexibly enough 
to welcome new developments. Such a development is the trilateral 
framework for cooperation among Japan, Korea and China. Statements such 
as “APT is the most important” do theory a disservice! They do not help us 
know what will happen, and when it’s coming, we will not see it. Analytically 
blinded, we will strive instead to reinforce the “truth” that we have once 
discovered. 
Certainly, states in their actions are not obliged by holding APT the most 
important. “But even as governments and their representatives meet and learn 
to cooperate, the very process of interaction continues to reshape their 
agendas…” (Pempel 2005:265). Therefore, APT mattered. The timing, 
however, matters too, and we must be prepared to look in new directions. At 
the moment when it was said that APT looked the most promising, we should 
already be on a quest for new directions in Asian institutions. Then we can be 
more fine-tuned to using any data–very little data, only indicative data–to build 
future scenarios – and subsequently test them. As David Tuckett, 
psychoanalyst at University College London, asked: “can we identify 
narratives when they are not yet at the surface? Can we learn about how they 
come and go?” 37 , we need to ask ourselves too. So engrossed in 
encapsulating the present, we have not captured the future. Perhaps 
interactions within the “+3” countries were not at all studied in the scholarship 
on APT, known as “the most important framework” is East Asia. 
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To put it simply, if we have already decided that APT is the most important, 
our whole knowledge will collapse by allowing in the TC–a welcome new 
development on the Asian soil, but a ‘crack’ in APT. We may want instead to 
quickly switch our “anticipatory gaze” in the new direction.38  To assist us in 
this aim, adding up “small” pieces of truth that we have encountered along the 
way might prove helpful; if we link everything back to theory–even if only the 
theory of Asian regionalism–conclusions from studying one institution will add 
up to studying the next.39 Practically, this may translate into something as 
simple as building testable hypotheses.40 The benefit of this is as follows: it 
will allow us to keep the most 'expensive’ core of the analytical structure we 
have erected, and carefully rebuild the less ‘expensive’ rest, step by step. The 
assumption is that for IR, the most durable part, but also the most costly to 
construct, is theory. The whole structure of our conclusions on what Asian 
regionalism is, and where it is going, must be more flexible, taking example 
from the new San Francisco bridge that sways when the earth trembles.41 
Then every shake to our established knowledge – every new challenge – will 
only make us, the discipline, stronger. In this light, we can have a theory of 
Asian regionalism. Rather than complaining what such a theory will not have, 
we shall consider what it would tell us; at least, it could tell us more about the 
development and the future of Asian institutions. 
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